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ARTICLE
THE FOLKLORE AND SYMBOLISM OF
AUTHORSHIP IN AMERICAN COPYRIGHT LAW
Shyamkrishna Balganesh *
ABSTRACT
Despite its formal commitment to “authorship,” American
copyright law pays surprisingly little doctrinal attention to
understanding the concept. Originality, taken to be modern
copyright law’s proxy for authorship, has come to assume a life of
its own, with little regard to the system’s supposed ideals of
authorship. What role then does authorship play in modern
American copyright law? This Article argues that authorship is
best understood as a form of folklore and symbolism in copyright
law. Drawing on the anthropological strand of Legal Realism
advanced and developed by Thurman Arnold, the Article argues
that authorship serves an important symbolic purpose within
copyright thinking, which enables the institution to develop
around idealized accounts of individual creativity even when those
accounts are hard to anchor in reality. Arnold famously argued
that in numerous contexts, legal rules and devices serve the role
of mediating between an institution’s practical manifestations and
society’s beliefs about the proper objectives of that institutional
framework. Rather than advocate for their abolition, Arnold
argued that these devices enabled the rationalization and
legitimation of an institution, when worthy of being reformed from
the inside. Authorship, in this understanding, functions as an
* Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. Many thanks to
Rebecca Curtin, David Fagundes, Terry Fisher, Craig Joyce, Peter Menell, Judge Jon
Newman, Gideon Parchomovsky, Kristelia Garcia Peterson, Pam Samuelson, Andres
Sawicki, Xinqiang “David” Sun, Molly Van Houweling, and all the participants at the 2016
IPIL/University of Houston Symposium for valuable comments and suggestions.
Responsibility for all errors remains with the Author.
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all-important framing device for the institution of copyright. The
Article develops this symbolic account of authorship, and shows
how it allows copyright law and jurisprudence to make sense of
various anomalies within the system.
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INTRODUCTION

Authorship is the real sine qua non of copyright law.
Regardless of whether one’s theory of copyright is normative or
descriptive, explanatory or justificatory, or consequentialist or
deontic, authorship occupies a central place therein. The
author—the individual that the law ascribes the production of
the creative work to—occupies an especially exalted place in
Anglo-American copyright law. 1 Initially introduced into the text
of the Statute of Anne, 2 and later expressly incorporated into the

1. For a useful history, see MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF
COPYRIGHT 1–66 (1993).
2. Statute of Anne 1710, 8 Ann. c. 19 (Eng.) (“An act for the encouragement of
learning, by vesting the copies of printed books in the authors or purchasers of such copies,
during the times therein mentioned.” (emphasis added)).
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U.S. Constitution 3 and every federal copyright statute since, 4 the
author and the associated phenomenon of authorship are today a
mainstay of copyright jurisprudence and its constitutive
vocabulary. As some scholars observe, the idea of authorship
maintains a “hold” on the “American legal imagination,” rendering
it the “most central” and “most resonant” concept in American
copyright law. 5
Histories and historiographies of the idea (of authorship)
abound in the literature. 6 Some argue that the idea was received
from other domains of study, where a Romantic conception
prevailed; 7 others argue that the idea evolved internally within
American copyright doctrine much later, and by incorporating
other Enlightenment ideals. 8 Yet, none of these histories provide
an explanation for a problem that confronts modern American
copyright jurisprudence to this day, despite the putative
prominence of the author and authorship therein: the complete
absence of a legal definition/account of the author, and of
authorship. Unlike jurisdictions that offer such a definition, or
instead operationalize the idea through rebuttable presumptions
that are premised on contributions during the creative process, 9
American copyright law—both statutory and common law—
dodges the question altogether. Case law addressing authorship is
scattered and fragmented (at best), and originality—often treated
as a proxy for authorship—has evolved to perform a largely
different analytical role within copyright doctrine. The obvious
questions that this trend therefore raises are: why this is so,
whether this avoidance actually serves some hitherto unidentified
purpose, and what that unstated purpose might indeed be. My
objective in this Essay is to answer all three questions, which I
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (authorizing Congress “[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries” (emphasis added)).
4. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012) (limiting copyright protection to “works of
authorship”).
5. Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of “Authorship”,
1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 455; Peter Jaszi & Martha Woodmansee, Introduction to THE
CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP: TEXTUAL APPROPRIATION IN LAW AND LITERATURE 10
(Martha Woodmansee & Peter Jaszi eds., 1994).
6. See, e.g., CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP supra note 5; ROSE, supra note 1;
MICHAEL NEWBURY, FIGURING AUTHORSHIP IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA (1997); JACK
STILLINGER, MULTIPLE AUTHORSHIP AND THE MYTH OF SOLITARY GENIUS (1991); LIOR
ZEMER, THE IDEA OF AUTHORSHIP IN COPYRIGHT (2007); Oren Bracha, The Ideology of
Authorship Revisited: Authors, Markets, and Liberal Values in Early American Copyright,
118 YALE L.J. 186, 192 (2008).
7. See, e.g., Jaszi, supra note 5, at 466–68, 470.
8. Bracha, supra note 6, at 188–92.
9. See, e.g., Copyright, Designs and Patent Act 1988, c. 48, § 9 (UK).
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argue together shed important light on salient aspects of the
copyright system.
It is, of course, unclear whether American copyright law’s
decision to avoid offering a legal account, or mechanism for
determining authorship was in any sense deliberate. 10 The
legislative history accompanying the copyright statute of 1976 is
largely silent on the contours of authorship. 11 All the same, this
omission and its consequent production of a more amorphous and
evanescent understanding of the idea can be seen to play an
important expressive role in the working of the system.
To understand this role, I draw in this Essay on the
psychological/anthropological strand of Legal Realism famously
advanced in the 1930s by Thurman Arnold. 12 While Arnold joined
with the other prominent Legal Realists of his era to show the
emptiness of legal concepts, he at the same time broke with them
to argue that such concepts, devoid as they were of autonomous
meaning, played a symbolic role in the legal system. 13 As symbols,
these concepts exerted a reflexive influence on the psyche of the
public and on participants within the system. The law’s symbols
mediated the public’s idealized accounts of an institution—which
were incapable of being realized—and the actual operation of the
institution, and thereby helped preserve the legitimacy and
respect that were critical to its effective functioning. 14 Symbols
10. For recent efforts to recast authorship within American copyright doctrine, see
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Causing Copyright, 117 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017);
Christopher J. Buccafusco, A Theory of Copyright Authorship, 102 VA. L. REV. 1229 (2016).
11. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1733 (1976) (Conf. Rep.) (showing no reference to the definition
of authorship in any of the discussions).
12. See generally THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT (1935)
[hereinafter ARNOLD, SYMBOLS]; THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM
(1937) [hereinafter ARNOLD, FOLKLORE]; Mark Fenster, The Symbols of Governance:
Thurman Arnold and Post-Realist Legal Theory, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 1053 (2003).
13. See ARNOLD, SYMBOLS, supra note 12, at 34–35.
14. Arnold’s account of the role of law in legitimating power bears a stark
resemblance in this regard to the work of Antonio Gramsci, whose work on the idea of
“hegemony” is well-known, and has been used to account for the way in which law operates.
See, e.g., Douglas Litowitz, Gramsci, Hegemony, and the Law, 2000 BYU L. REV. 515 (2000).
Gramsci’s work influenced the thinking of the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement, most
prominently through the writing of Duncan Kennedy.
According to Kennedy, hegemony consists in “the exercise of domination through
political legitimacy, rather than through force” and entails “the acquisition of the consent
of the governed.” Duncan Kennedy, Antonio Gramsci and the Legal System, 6 ALSA F. 32,
32 (1982). The idea thus took shape under the rubric of “law and ideology.” See Robert W.
Gordon, Law and Ideology, TIKKUN, Jan.–Feb. 1988, 15 (“Legal discourses are saturated
with categories and images that for the most part rationalize and justify in myriad subtle
ways the existing social order as natural, necessary, and just.”). Kennedy himself described
this idea as that of “legal consciousness.” DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF
CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT 2 (2006) (observing that legal consciousness mediates the
influence of ideology, economic interest and political power on “particular legal results”).
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thus played an important “social role” for an institution, and
operated as “anthropological subterfuges erected to protect
cultural taboos,” which allowed an institution to balance
continuity and change. 15
The law’s symbols therefore contributed to a folklore, which
allowed the participants in the system to rationalize the
irrationality of their activities, and to find “order out of chaos.” 16
It is this process of rationalization that resulted in elaborate
rituals within the legal system, which in turn served as forms of
“consolation,” 17 by bridging ideal formulations of legal and market
institutions with their actual practice in reality. 18 The folklore
thus generated, to Arnold, allowed government institutions to
reach their ideals by closing the obvious psychological gap between
illusion and reality. Arnold’s work thus exhibited both
psychological and anthropological strands, and was at once both
cynical and constructive of legal institutions. It embraced the
pragmatism of law as a functional enterprise that sought to
achieve certain goals, and at the same time recognized the need
for change when an institution’s credibility—despite its folklore—
fell into doubt. 19
As such, Arnold’s account provides us with an interesting new
way to think about the role of authorship in copyright law. In this
understanding, authorship might be fruitfully understood as a
legitimating and mediating symbol for the copyright system. Ever
since its origins, copyright jurisprudence has struggled to
articulate a coherent theoretical and justificatory rationale for the
institution. While the ideal of “progress” is taken to guide the
working of the system, the normative parameters of that construct

Arnold does not appear to have placed overt reliance on the work of Gramsci.
Indeed, in attempting to justify aspects of the status quo, his arguments placed him apart
from the Legal Realists at the time, who formed the intellectual forebears of the CLS
movement. Nevertheless, some have seen a Gramscian strand in some of his writing on the
role of symbolism in American law. See Wolfgang Kaupen, Comment, in EUROPEAN
YEARBOOK IN LAW AND SOCIOLOGY 140, 141 (B.-M. Blegvad, C.M. Campbell & C.J. Schuyt
eds., 1977). I do not explore here the intellectual connection between Arnold, Gramsci and
the CLS movement, despite these similarities.
15. Warren J. Samuels, Legal Realism and the Burden of Symbolism: The
Correspondence of Thurman Arnold, 13 LAW & SOC. REV. 997, 1005 (1979) (quoting
VOLTAIRE AND THE COWBOY: THE LETTERS OF THURMAN ARNOLD 61 (Gene M. Gressley ed.,
1977)).
16. See Max Lerner, The Shadow World of Thurman Arnold, 47 YALE L.J. 687, 689
(1938); see also ARNOLD, FOLKLORE, supra note 12, at 356–61.
17. See Lerner, supra note 16, at 690.
18. See ARNOLD, FOLKLORE, supra note 12, at 356–57.
19. See id. at 360–75.
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have remained deeply contested. 20 Social welfare maximization, 21
inducement of creativity, 22 the protection of creative labor, 23 the
protection of individual autonomy, 24 and the realization of
distributive justice, 25 are justifications that have all found a home
in the copyright system, under the rubric of progress. Yet, the fact
remains that every last one of these principles finds it impossible
to explain significant swaths of the copyright landscape, much of
which has remained immutable since the institution’s very origins.
In addition, they also remain fundamentally incompatible with
each other, so as to be collectively subsumed into the system. This
poses an obvious legitimacy challenge for the copyright system.
The idea of authorship plays a crucial role here, relying on the
“author” as an important symbol, which allows the copyright
system to gloss over the inadequacies of each of these individual
principles, as well as the absence of a coherent justificatory
account for its overall functioning. The author, in short, becomes
a symbol through which each of copyright’s justifications mediates
the inadequacy of its explanatory power, or of its empirical basis.
Authorship, in essence, operates as a viable middle-level principle
that at once allows the system to mask its conflicting goals, while
at the same time offering outsiders a coherent and psychologically
palatable picture of the institution’s legitimacy.
Connecting the copyright system’s myriad—and complex—
machinations to the folklore of authorship, which revolves around
the image of an actual human agent benefiting from the working
of the system, anchors the institution in society’s deeply held
intuitions about individualism, creativity, fairness, autonomy,
markets, and ownership, while glossing over their abstract
20. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. For accounts of the term “progress” within
copyright law, see Michael D. Birnhack, The Idea of Progress in Copyright Law, 1 BUFF.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 3 (2001); Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause:
Promotion of Progress as a Limitation on Congress’s Intellectual Property Power, 94 GEO.
L.J. 1771 (2006); L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, Copyright in 1791: An Essay Concerning
the Founders’ View of the Copyright Power Granted to Congress in Article I, Section 8,
Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution, 52 EMORY L.J. 909 (2003).
21. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of
Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989) (explaining copyright as a “means for
promoting the efficient allocation of resources”).
22. See, e.g., Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122
HARV. L. REV. 1569 (2009) (attempting to understanding copyright in terms of its theory of
incentivizing creativity).
23. See, e.g., Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and
Possession, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 517, 523–24, 536–37 (1990).
24. See ABRAHAM DRASSINOWER, WHAT’S WRONG WITH COPYING? 17–18, 57, 59
(2015).
25. See, e.g., Justin Hughes & Robert P. Merges, Copyright and Distributive Justice,
92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2016).
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inconsistencies. It allows courts creating copyright jurisprudence
to implicitly rationalize their decisions in terms of an illusory
version of reality, which allows the system to continue functioning,
and realizing its myriad—and incommensurable—goals.
This Essay is divided into three parts. Part I begins with an
overview of how American copyright law embodies a fundamental
mismatch in its reliance on authorship. While courts and agencies
routinely use the author and the ideal of authorship, either
directly or indirectly, as rationalizing mechanisms, copyright
jurisprudence contains an incoherent account of both (i.e., the
author and authorship). Part II then offers a symbolism- and
folklore-based account of authorship, which explains the
legitimating role that it plays. It begins with an overview of
Thurman Arnold’s core anthropological and psychological ideas for
legal institutions (II.A.), and then applies them to copyright law
and the symbols of the author and authorship therein (II.B). Part
III then unpacks the consequences for copyright thinking and
reform that flow from this understanding, both positive and
normative.
Before proceeding further, a few observations about the
nature of the account offered herein, are in order. First, the
account of authorship offered here is by no means a historical
reconstruction of how/why authorship came to influence copyright
thinking. It therefore does not seek to add to the rich literature
that exists on this topic. Instead, it grapples with the role of
authorship in the contemporary copyright system. And in so doing,
it offers an explanation for the mismatch between copyright
doctrine, which embodies a fleeting understanding of authorship,
and the principal author-centric justifications for copyright law.
Second, and much like Arnold himself, the account is consciously
ambivalent about the virtues and vices of authorship as a form of
symbolism in copyright thinking. While on the one hand the
symbolism certainly distracts from a clearer theoretical
elucidation of the system, it at the same time serves a crucial
pragmatic purpose that allows the system as a whole to continue
functioning, albeit with myriad imperfections that are each
capable of being individually remedied.
II. THE AUTHORSHIP MISMATCH
Copyright law purports to care about the “author” and
“authorship.” Yet, copyright doctrine and jurisprudence lack a
coherent understanding of both. Despite this, the most common
efforts that seek some consilience in copyright law, whether
explanatory or justificatory, operate by focusing on the author.
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This Part unpacks this mismatch; first by looking at the doctrinal
omission and then by examining the analytics of copyright
rationalization seen within the system. While the authorship
discourse in copyright law embodies a variety of different
paradoxes, it is this fundamental mismatch that concerns the
argument here.
A. Authorship in Copyright Doctrine
A focus on the “author” permeates the modern doctrinal
discourse of copyright in a variety of different ways: Copyright
protection attaches only to a work of “authorship,” 26 the “author”
is treated as the presumptive first owner of the copyright in a
work, 27 two or more authors can jointly create a work of joint
authorship, 28 lawful fixation requires the “authority of the
author,” 29 national origin looks to the “domicile of the author,” 30
and certain categories of “authors” are accorded the rights of
attribution and integrity. 31 The list goes on. Yet, copyright
doctrine and jurisprudence are striking in their refusal to offer an
analytical definition for the “author” and “authorship.” 32
The omission as such is hardly unique to American copyright
law, 33 but it remains fairly noticeable given that several of
copyright law’s doctrines make reference to authorship without an
analytical basis for the idea. Indeed, when one digs deeper into
copyright’s specific doctrines, their understanding of authorship is
seen to be ephemeral. Consider in this regard the doctrine of
originality, often taken to be the law’s proxy for authorship. 34 In
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Company, the
Supreme Court crystallized the American understanding of
originality, by locating its roots in the Constitution and declaring
it to be the sine qua non of copyright protection. 35 The Court’s
standard for originality thus emanated as “independent creation
plus a modicum of creativity.” 36 Independent creation in turn has
26. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
27. Id. § 201(a).
28. Id. § 101 (defining “joint work”).
29. Id. § 101 (defining “fixation”).
30. Id. § 104(a).
31. Id. § 106A.
32. See Jane C. Ginsburg, The Concept of Authorship in Comparative Copyright Law,
52 DEPAUL L. REV. 1063, 1069 (2003) (describing the sparseness of judicial decisions and
definitions of these ideas).
33. Id. at 1069–72.
34. Id. at 1078 (describing originality as “synonymous” with authorship).
35. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv., Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345–48 (1991).
36. Id. at 346.
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been understood as requiring that the expression at issue “owe its
origin[s]” to the individual claiming authorship. 37 The author is
therefore the person to whom a work owes its origins. But what
does it mean for a work to “owe its origins” to someone? And here,
one might have hoped that Feist and its progeny would have
developed a standard that adds meat to the bare idea of owing, and
thereby produced a workable standard for authorship. The reality
is to the contrary and somewhat disappointing. Under current
jurisprudence, a work is presumed to “owe its origins” to someone
as long as it is “not copied.” 38 This negative formulation strips the
“owing” thread of authorship of any real significance.
A further complication inherent in the originality-authorship
connection is the reality that with Feist’s rejection of the “sweat of
the brow” doctrine, the law has come to focus on the modicum of
creativity as manifested in the work itself and never beyond. 39
Thus, an exceptionally creative process that produces an
altogether uncreative outcome in the work, would find no basis for
protection. Authorship as a process—rather than as a result—is
never the basis of independent scrutiny under the modern
originality standard. 40 This is not to suggest that originality is
performing no other role within the system credibly, just that its
authorship-role is at best nominal. Just as a work of authorship
may fail the demands of originality, so too a work of expression
may exhibit significant creativity on its face to qualify as original,
and yet fail the law’s demand for authorship, quite
independently—e.g., a photograph “taken” by a monkey. 41
Originality is hardly copyright’s stand-in for authorship.
The same story is just as true for some of copyright law’s other
doctrines, each of which pays lip service to authorship (seen in
judicial rhetoric), but as a functional matter focuses on other
considerations. The joint works doctrine is another good example,
where courts emphasize the need for both contributors to each be
37. Id. at 363.
38. Novelty Textile Mills, Inc. v. Joan Fabrics Corp., 558 F.2d 1090, 1093 n.3 (2d Cir.
1977); 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.01[A][1]
(Matthew Bender rev. ed. 2016) (“[A] work is original and may command copyright
protection even if it is completely identical with a prior work, provided it was not copied
from that prior work but is instead a product of the independent efforts of its author.”).
39. Feist, 499 U.S. at 354–56.
40. See Balganesh, supra note 10, at 4.
41. See, e.g., Samuel Gibbs, Monkey Business: Macaque Selfie Can’t Be Copyrighted,
Say US and UK, GUARDIAN (Aug. 22, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com
/technology/2014/aug/22/monkey-business-macaque-selfie-cant-be-copyrighted-say-us-anduk [https://perma.cc/2FGX-867E]; Danny Cevallos, When a Monkey Takes a Selfie, CNN
(Aug. 18, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/08/opinion/cevallos-monkey-selfie-copyright/
[https://perma.cc/3BCQ-FP8S].
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authors and yet, provide no clear basis on which to assess such
authorship beyond conclusory or impressionistic observations.
Their ultimate finding of joint authorship turns on more pragmatic
considerations relating to the interaction between the
collaborators, almost none of which deals with authorship as
such. 42 Or, consider the work made for hire doctrine, wherein
copyright law treats a work prepared by an employee during the
course of employment as authored—not just owned—by the
employer. 43 As a rule of authorship, the doctrine might be thought
to embody a plausible account of authorship, and yet a deeper
scrutiny reveals that it simply doesn’t, but instead employs the
language of authorship in purely consequential terms, i.e., as a
pathway to ownership.
Modern copyright doctrine therefore contains no discernible
common understanding of authorship, or indeed the activities or
their attributes that qualify for this status. When the law makes
decisions (usually of denial) in terms of authorship, it usually is an
indication that some underlying intuition about the claimant, the
nature of the subject matter for which protection is being sought,
the context of its creation, or the connection between the claimant
and the expression (e.g., causation) is at play in the determination.
B. Authorship as Rationalization
Contrary to common perception then, copyright doctrine (and
jurisprudence) embody no coherent analytical understanding of
the author, or of the process of authorship. The term is used within
doctrine largely as a referent for the first-claimant of copyright
protection, and then in a conclusory fashion beyond that. Yet none
of this stops copyright’s principal institutions from relying on
authorship as a method of rationalization for their outcomes and
decisions.
“Rationalization” is not just a reference to the copyright
rhetoric commonly seen in the academic discourse about the
institution. It is in addition, a reference to the methods of
justification and explanatory consilience that participants within
the system—principally courts and judges, but also the relevant
governmental agency (i.e., the Copyright Office), and occasionally
Congress—use to justify individual and collective aspects of the
system. The exclusion of theoretical literature by copyright
academics from the domain of this inquiry is not to suggest that
42. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Unplanned Coauthorship, 100 VA. L. REV. 1683,
1699 (2014).
43. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2012).
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such authorship-driven reasoning is absent therein; it is instead
merely in furtherance of the core purpose of this Essay, which is
to examine how the institution of copyright justifies and mediates
itself from within, through the symbolism and folklore of
authorship. 44 Such rationalization can be seen to occur in two
distinct forms, both of which are equally intriguing.
The first is what we may call contextual (or direct) and it
represents efforts by individual decision-makers to arrive at a
doctrinal conclusion in an individual case and then explain the
analytical logic of the doctrinal outcome using the nebulous
concept of authorship, on the unstated assumption that it contains
determinate meaning. Here, authorship is doing the work of
integrating the individual outcome at hand with the presumptive
focal logic of the institution as a whole, i.e., authorship. Consider
a few examples of this practice. In one case, the Seventh Circuit
denied copyright protection to an aesthetically appealing garden,
concluding that it was not copyrightable expression that satisfied
the law’s “fixation” requirement. 45 According to the court, the
garden was not a method, process or system, but instead was “not
the kind of authorship required for copyright.” 46 A few years
earlier, the same court had also considered whether an actor’s
persona or likeness might be a protectable under copyright. 47 And
it concluded that “[a] person’s likeness—her persona—is not
authored” in a sense relevant for protection even though fixed. 48 It
was found not to be a “work of authorship” under this logic. 49 In
both cases, authorship rationalized individual subject-matter
decisions.
Such contextual rationalization is seen in the logic of
non-court actors as well. A photograph orchestrated by a wildlife
44. As we shall see later, Arnold recognized that the academic discourse too played
an important role in conforming the rationalizations of courts, through the production of
what he called an “abstract jurisprudence” that operated behind court decisions. See infra
note 129 and accompanying text. In his account, however, it readily appears that the
academic discourse, especially to the extent that it is critical rather than supportive of the
institution, takes a secondary place. See ARNOLD, SYMBOLS, supra note 12, at 48–59.
45. Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 303–04 (7th Cir. 2011).
46. Id. at 304. The court further noted:
[G]ardens are planted and cultivated, not authored. A garden’s constituent
elements are alive and inherently changeable, not fixed. Most of what we see and
experience in a garden—the colors, shapes, textures, and scents of the plants—
originates in nature, not in the mind of the gardener. At any given moment in
time, a garden owes most of its form and appearance to natural forces, though the
gardener who plants and tends it obviously assists.
Id.
47. Toney v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 406 F.3d 905, 910 (7th Cir. 2005).
48. Id. at 910.
49. Id.
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photographer by luring wild monkeys to play with his camera was
deemed unprotectable under the law, because it was “taken by a
monkey” and did not evince “human authorship.” 50 Again, the logic
of authorship rationalized the conclusion that the photographer’s
involvement was insufficient to be worthy of protection. Such
contextual rationalization is in contrast to what we may call
systemic (or indirect) rationalization, wherein the decision-maker
arrives at an individual doctrinal decision using analytical logic
unrelated to authorship, but then connects it to the role of
authorship in the working of the system as a whole. In so doing,
the decision-maker is attempting to justify (rather than integrate)
the decision within the overall skein of the system. The principal
difference is therefore that the rationalization in the systemic
version relies less directly on the individual concept of authorship
as such, and more on the implicit rationale for the system as a
whole, which in turn connects back to the author and to
authorship.
Deriving from the logic of “progress” 51 and the
“encouragement of learning,” 52 much of the copyright system is
today justified and explained internally in terms of inducements
to create. Under this theory, the institution of copyright exists to
encourage individuals to produce original expression, through the
promise of marketable exclusive rights in the expression so
produced. 53 This inducement account, as should be obvious, pivots
around the idea of encouraging authorship by incentivizing
authors. Focused as it is on the creation of original expression, it
presumes significant social value in the production and
distribution of work emanating from the author’s actions. Put
another way, the author is crucial to the inducement account, and
without who the edifice of the theory falls apart. It is this authorial
emphasis that keeps property-ideas somewhat at bay in the
copyright discourse, since arguments about the efficient allocation
of resources 54—independent of where they originate—become
somewhat secondary. Thus, even if it may well be that copyright
in practice incentivizes non-authorial participants in the system,
50. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES
§313.2, at 22 (3d ed. 2014).
51. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
52. Statute of Anne 1710, 8 Ann. c. 19 (Eng.).
53. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559
(1985) (“By establishing a marketable right to the use of one’s expression, copyright
supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.”).
54. But see Richard A. Epstein, The Disintegration of Intellectual Property? A
Classical Liberal Response to a Premature Obituary, 62 STAN. L. REV. 455, 457, 480–81
(2010) (arguing that copyright law developed by analogy to physical property).
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such as distributors and other intermediaries, these participants
are treated as unequivocally secondary to authors, whose
interests/incentives are seen as central to the system. 55
The Supreme Court’s most direct—and recent—benediction of
this reasoning occurred about a decade ago in the now infamous
Eldred decision. 56 Validating the constitutionality of a retroactive
extension of copyright by Congress, the Court rather quickly
moved its reasoning to the interests of the author: first, by noting
that equality in protection as between authors who create at
different points in time was important as a matter of fairness and
equity; 57 second, by emphasizing that longer protection in the U.S.
would indeed induce more authors to create and disseminate their
work domestically; 58 and third, that in promoting authorial
creation, copyright law was furthering free expression. 59 It
mattered little to the Court that the real benefit of the extension
may have accrued to the non-authorial participants, who through
assignments and transfers, had become copyright-owners under
the law, a point that Justice Breyer’s dissent forcefully brought out
in noting that it was “not the author” but rather “distant heirs” or
the “shareholders” of a corporation who would see the putative
benefits. 60 Falling back on the benefits—incentives and
monetary—that would accrue to the author was thus central to the
majority’s logic, even though it might have found more plausible
justification elsewhere.
Eldred is in many ways just the tip of the iceberg as far as
this form of author-centric rationalization goes. The use of
authorship as the primary justification for individual copyright
decisions arrived at using myriad non-authorial doctrines, is a
fairly pervasive phenomenon that is seen in judicial reasoning
within the system. 61 Creating and preserving the author’s
55. See generally Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright and Control over New Technologies of
Dissemination, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1645–47 (2001) (“The control the nonauthor right
holders enjoy derives from the rights the Constitution ensures to creators.”); Wendy J.
Gordon, The Core of Copyright: Authors, Not Publishers, 52 HOUS. L. REV. 613 (2014).
56. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
57. Id. at 204.
58. Id. at 206.
59. Id. at 219–21.
60. Id. at 254–55 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
61. For a small sample, see Luck’s Music Library, Inc. v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 1262,
1264 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (upholding the validity of the Uruguay Round Agreement Act on the
ground that it provides an extra incentive to authors); Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l,
Inc., 293 F.3d 791, 805 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting the incentives for authors argument in
relation to the protectability of standards created by private parties); Gates Rubber Co. v.
Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 839 (10th Cir. 1993) (“Copyright policy is meant to
balance protection, which seeks to ensure a fair return to authors and inventors and thereby
to establish incentives for development, with dissemination, which seeks to foster learning,
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incentive to create has become a common metric that courts use to
explain and rationalize their decisions to accord/deny copyright
protection to works—whether as a category or individually. They
trace their answers to questions of copyrightability, fair use,
substantial similarity, joint works, and the scope of individual
rights rather routinely back to this idea, wherein the author—as
originator of the creativity—is seen as the principal protagonist of
the entire system.
This focus on authorial incentives is hardly unique to federal
courts interpreting and applying copyright doctrine. Executive
branch proposals and descriptions of the system contain similar
rationalizations of the system. A recent Department of Commerce
Green Paper, focused on extensions of copyright to the digital
environment, echoed the incentives rationale for authors as well,
noting at the very outset that “copyright law gives creators
incentives to produce new works and distribute them to the
public.” 62 Analogously, a Copyright Office description of the
country’s earliest copyright law described it as having “provided
authors with exclusive rights as an incentive to create original
works.” 63
My point here is not to question the empirical validity or
explanatory virtues of copyright’s theory of incentives. It is to
suggest, quite simply, that as contemporary copyright’s dominant
form of systemic rationalization, the incentives account isn’t just
one about the inducement of creative works in the abstract. It is
instead a rationalization that focuses on authors’ incentives, and
on the system acting as an inducement for authors to produce
creative works. The author (and authorship) are both critical
features of the incentives story.
Herein lies the mismatch. Whereas copyright doctrine and
jurisprudence shy away from defining the author, or of providing
an analytical framework for identifying an author or assessing
whether there has been authorship as a precondition for
protection, courts routinely rationalize their decisions—
occasionally directly, but more commonly indirectly—using the
progress and development.”); Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385, 396 (4th Cir. 2003) (interpreting
the fourth fair use factor in terms of the “author’s ability to capture the fruits of his labor
and hence his incentive to create”).
62. DEPT. OF COMMERCE INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE, COPYRIGHT POLICY,
CREATIVITY, AND INNOVATION IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, at i (2013), https://www.uspto
.gov/sites/default/files/news/publications/copyrightgreenpaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/EVG8XQDW].
63. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, STRATEGIC PLAN 2008–2013, at 4 (2008),
http://www.copyright.gov/reports/s-plan2008/s-plan2008-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/32R3CUDN].
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logic of authorship and the incentives that author’s need for their
activities. This rationalization therefore exhibits a clear
disconnect from its actual doctrinal content.
III. THE FOLKLORE OF AUTHORSHIP
Having examined how the putative emphasis on authorship
in copyright rationalization has little doctrinal correspondence,
this Part develops a rationale to explain this mismatch. In doing
so, it draws on Thurman Arnold’s theory about the role of
symbolism and folklore in American legal thinking and
governance, to argue that authorship represents a form of
symbolism that performs a legitimating role for the copyright
system. III.A begins with an overview of Arnold’s general theory;
III.B then applies the theory to authorship.
A. Thurman Arnold on Symbolism and Folklore in American
Law
Within the world of Legal Realism, a movement that
identified itself with seeking to reveal the indeterminacy of legal
doctrine in producing individual decisions, 64 Thurman Arnold is
routinely treated as an outlier. 65 While he joined with many of the
other Realists to criticize the naïve belief in the autonomy of
doctrinal thinking (associated with “Legal Formalism”), 66 he at the
same time resisted being seen as just another Legal Realist. 67 And
this was for one central reason: he believed that legal doctrine, and
its constitutive devices, ideas, and rules, played an important
instrumental role in legal thinking, which the traditional
approach to Legal Realism had failed to fully appreciate. It
enabled the legal system—through its myriad participants—to
preserve its legitimacy, while nonetheless striving for internal
reform and perfection. Or, as he put it, efforts to eliminate such
ideas and devices would render reformist legal thinking
considerably impractical. 68

64. See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 429 (1934).
65. Neil Duxbury, Some Radicalism About Realism: Thurman Arnold and the Politics
of Modern Jurisprudence, 10 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 11, 12 (1990) (describing Arnold as
belonging to the peripheral or radical strand of Legal Realism).
66. See, e.g., Thurman W. Arnold, The Restatement of the Law of Trusts, 31 COLUM.
L. REV. 800 (1931).
67. See Fenster, supra note 12, at 1054 (“Unlike conventional realists, Arnold had
little faith that mere reform would cure governing institutions and the public of their
irrational investments in the symbols of government and capitalism.”).
68. ARNOLD, SYMBOLS, supra note 12, at 6–10.
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Between 1930 and 1938, Arnold was a law professor at the
Yale Law School, a hotbed of Legal Realist thinking at the time. 69
While sympathetic to his colleagues, his own orientation towards
Realism was heavily influenced by a pragmatic outlook; one that
would result in his eventually leaving the academy to serve in the
federal government, 70 then as a federal judge on the D.C. Circuit, 71
and finally as a founding partner of one of Washington D.C.’s
prominent law firms. 72 This pragmatic outlook greatly influenced
his approach to legal analysis, and his unwillingness to
simplistically abandon the role of legal doctrine and principles
because of their apparent vacuity.
In his first book, The Symbols of Government, Arnold referred
to as “symbols” the “ceremonies and theories of social
institutions . . . which condition the behavior of men.” 73 In his
thinking, legal institutions originate in the pursuit of certain
ideals, which they encapsulate as “fundamental principles.” 74 Yet
in practice, those very institutions come to abandon these
fundamental principles in individual cases, as they attempt to give
effect to “conflicting ideals” in practice. 75 The Realists, in his
understanding, wrongly used this to reveal the “foolishness” of the
enterprise associated with the fundamental principles themselves,
which they saw as largely deceptive. 76 Instead, Arnold claimed,
these principles were essential to the institution in so far they
anchored its “moral support” and triggered its own instincts of
self-preservation. 77 In this vein, he had the following to offer by
way of contrasting his approach to that of the ordinary (i.e.,
Realist) scholar:
Legal principles are [usually] discussed as things which
govern a society which has never studied them, or else
as meaningless ritual which has no effect, even upon the
courts which use them. . . . On the other hand, if the
discovery is made that no legal formulas can long retain
any definite meaning, the assumption is that their
pronouncement should not affect judicial conduct, and

69. For the authoritative account of Legal Realism at Yale, see LAURA KALMAN,
LEGAL REALISM AT YALE 1927–1960 (1986).
70. SPENCER WEBER WALLER, THURMAN ARNOLD: A BIOGRAPHY 76–78 (2005).
71. Id. at 111 (describing it as a “short unhappy judgeship”).
72. Id. at 124 (describing the founding of “Arnold, Fortas & Porter” today known as
Arnold & Porter).
73. ARNOLD, SYMBOLS, supra note 12, at iv.
74. Id. at v.
75. Id. at 7–8.
76. Id. at 7.
77. Id. at 9.

Do Not Delete

11/21/2016 5:01 PM

2016] FOLKLORE AND SYMBOLISM OF AUTHORSHIP

419

therefore something else should be substituted. The
failure of the New York code to get rid of the distinction
between law and equity is treated either as showing that
these legal distinctions are fundamental to correct
thought, or else as a proof of judicial stupidity, instead
of as an example of reformers’ lack of understanding of
the mass psychology of the judicial institution from
which not even judges can escape.78

To Arnold, the law was no more than “a great reservoir of
emotionally important social symbols.” 79 And therein lay the
ultimate virtue of the law’s symbolic content:
[T]he escape of the law from reality constitutes not its
weakness but its greatest strength. Legal institutions
must constantly reconcile ideological conflicts, just as
individuals reconcile them by shoving inconsistencies back
into a sort of institutional subconscious mind. . . . The
abstract ideals of the law require for their public
acceptance symbolic conduct of a very definite pattern by a
definite institution which can be heard and seen. In this
way only can they achieve the dramatic presentation
necessary to make them moving forces in society. 80
A legal institution’s various concepts, devices, and principles
therefore played an important role in reconciling its conflicting
ideals—as realized in practice—and thereby according it an element
of “public acceptance.” 81 They created “faiths and loyalties concerning
governing forces.” 82 Arnold interspersed his account with various
examples of ceremonial rituals in the legal institutions, ranging from
law enforcement to jury trials and administrative law.83
Arnold’s account received its more abstract elucidation in his
follow up book, The Folklore of Capitalism, which he saw as a
continuation of his project in the first. 84 While he built out the idea
of the law’s ceremonies, rituals and symbols further in this book,
he at the same concretized it with examples. One such poignant
example was the “personification of great industrial enterprise”
through the idea of corporate personality. 85 “Courts,” Arnold

78. Id. at 28–29.
79. Id. at 34.
80. Id. at 44–45.
81. Id. at 44–45.
82. Id. at 45.
83. Id. at 128–49.
84. ARNOLD, FOLKLORE, supra note 12, at iii.
85. Id. at 185. For a recent theory, building on Arnold’s views on corporate law, see
Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbolic Corporate Governance Politics, 94 B.U. L. REV.
1997 (2014).
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argued, “have made a living thing out of this fiction.” 86 This in turn
had a critical symbolic effect on lay perceptions and “as men
instinctively thought of these great organizations as individuals,
the emotional analogies of home and freedom and all the other
trappings of ‘rugged individualism’ became their most potent
protection.” 87 The liberties of individuals became transposed to
organizations, which deflected attention from their behavior. The
initial symbolism eventually became self-perpetuating, as the
“actual world” and the “mythology” began to diverge, in turn
spawning a complex set of sub-ceremonies and rituals that built
on the original one. 88 Ceremonies became “the only way of giving
force to the creed.” 89
This is where Arnold disagreed with his other Realist
contemporaries. When they encountered legal fictions such as
corporate personality, which courts and legislators treated as
capable of producing determinate outcomes on their own, the
Realist impulse invariably attempted to jettison the concept
altogether from legal thinking. Felix Cohen, for instance, describe
corporate personality as emblematic of “transcendental nonsense,”
and as representing a “supernatural entit[y]” with no “verifiable
existence except to the eyes of faith.”90 He thus advocated for its
eradication from legal thinking, which needed to focus on the real
social issues at stake. 91 Arnold’s project, while principally
diagnostic, was equally reformist in orientation; yet significantly
more pragmatic than the traditional Realist response. He thus
emphasized that “[w]e cannot be practical about social problems if
we are under the illusion that we can solve them without complying
with the taboos and customs of the tribe.” 92 In his view the
“corporate personality is part of our present religion” and therefore
“[w]e must continue to refer to corporations as individuals in public
discourse so long as the words have emotional relevance.” 93 Instead
of jettisoning the fiction altogether, Arnold advocated
understanding its outward purpose and reforming it from within,
which allowed the practice to realize it attempted legitimation.
Arnold was thus fairly contemptuous of academic efforts to
deride the formal structure and logic of the law, when in the
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

ARNOLD, FOLKLORE, supra note 12, at 185.
Id. at 190.
Id. at 192, 199.
Id. at 193.
Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35
COLUM. L. REV. 809, 821 (1935).
91. Id. at 822.
92. ARNOLD, FOLKLORE, supra note 12, at 205.
93. Id.
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exclusive pursuit of any form of idealism. 94 An institution’s
folklore and symbolism—he believed—could never be understood
from an outsider’s point of view. What it needed instead was an
appreciation of how the members of the institutions, i.e., the
participants in its workings, derived value from those symbols. 95
In this respect, his approach to legal institutions was therefore
distinctively anthropological. Yet, unlike traditional anthropologists,
Arnold was quite willing to evaluate those practices to examine if
they were in fact realizing the social goals identified for the
institution. Recognizing that they did not embody an independent
“truth” value did not commit him to an indelible relativism.96 His
diagnostic project thus had a reformist side to it, but one which
demanded respect and deference to the insiders’ identification of
an important “emotional” role for the institution. 97
Distilling Arnold’s framework down then, one may fruitfully
identify the following general propositions in his account of the
folklore and symbolism of legal constructs:
The symbolism of a legal institutions is an inevitable reality of
their existence, drawn from the very way in which law and
governance function in American society. An institution’s symbolism
represents its “greatest strength,” from this functional point of
view. 98
An institution’s functioning contains two dimensions: the
“temporal” and the “spiritual.” 99 The latter represents its realm of
universal, formal principles that its idealistic creators embody it
with; while the former is the realm of the practical. 100
The spiritual, or idealist dimension of government is
centered in the judicial system, since it is the “stage on which the
ideal of society are given concrete reality.” 101 Courts were
therefore tasked with reconciling the old and new, and
rationalizing the working of the system in individual instances
through the use of the law’s various symbols. 102 It is in the
judicial rationalization of a legal institution then, that its
symbolism and folklore take center-stage.
94. See ARNOLD, SYMBOLS, supra note 12, at 52–59.
95. ARNOLD, FOLKLORE, supra note 12, at 353 (describing the effect of folklore on the
“members” or organization and institutions).
96. ARNOLD, SYMBOLS, supra note 12, at 9, 30 (criticizing the idea that beliefs
underlying an institution as capable of being classified as true or false).
97. Id. at 37; ARNOLD, FOLKLORE, supra note 12, at 21.
98. ARNOLD, SYMBOLS, supra note 12, at 44.
99. Id. at 105–27; see also Fenster, supra note 12, at 1067–68.
100. ARNOLD, SYMBOLS, supra note 12, at 127.
101. Id.
102. See id.
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The “creeds” of an institution, i.e., contained in the principles
undergirding it, “must be false” for the institution to “function
effectively.” 103 While this may seem heretical and paradoxical, it
isn’t just a cynical framing of the issue. It instead reflects the
reality that an institution needs to reconcile “contradictory ideals”
as it functions, which routinely requires it to “suppress any facts
which interfere with those ideals.” 104 The idealist goals and
principles of any institution are therefore almost never borne out
in reality, something that institutions self-consciously recognize.
While the “[l]ove of consistency and devotion to realism” may be
virtuous in the abstract, they are taken as functionally
disastrous. 105
The need for this discontinuity—between creed and
actuality—originates in an institution’s inability to reconcile
conflicting ideals. 106 This is a profound observation, in that it
underscores two important things about legal institutions and
thinking. The first, is that legal institutions are routinely
committed to a plurality of normative ideals, not all of which are
openly endorsed in idealized accounts of the institution. The
second, is that with such pluralism comes incommensurability,
and the recognition that many of these goals are intrinsically
incapable of co-existence or balancing within a single institutional
framework. It is these realities that produce the discontinuity,
which in turn trigger the solution of symbolism.
Relatedly, when the conflict (between the normative values)
is deep and pervasive, and the discontinuity therefore obvious and
direct, the ceremonies and folklore needed to bridge the gap
become more elaborate and complex. Conversely, when the conflict
is simple, and the discontinuity less significant, the ceremonies
may be “very simple.” 107 In other words, the folklore/symbolism
itself is dependent on the perceived discontinuity, given its
remedial orientation.
These propositions represent the descriptive component of
Arnold’s thinking—about the need for symbolism and folklore
within an institution. Arnold also offered a series of additional
remedial prescriptions for how, when, and why the folklore of a
legal institution might develop and advance in a particular way.
These are equally important for our discussion of authorship, as
we shall see.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

ARNOLD, FOLKLORE, supra note 12, at 356–57.
Id. at 357.
Id.
Id. at 358.
Id. at 358.
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Legal institutions are incapable of practicing what they
preach, which is the very need for the symbolism. Indeed, if the
institution’s ideals “were followed” the institution would be
incapable of functioning, given the vacuity of the ideal when
translated into practice. 108
It is often the case that an institution’s symbolism and
ceremonial folklore produce inefficiencies of their own, in its
functioning—especially in so far as they distract attention away
from the real social goals of the institution. 109 In this, we see a core
insight from Legal Realism. Nonetheless, this should not translate
into attempting to remake the institution in the image of its ideals.
At the same time, this does not mean accepting the
conflict/mismatch between the institution’s functioning and its
ideals as inevitable and irremediable. The key lies in recognizing
that any social value that an institution is saddled with must also
develop its own abstractions and folklore, which gain the
acceptance of the insiders and over time come to replace the old
ones. Arnold referred to this as the “propitiatory magic” that an
institution needs to effect a change in its normative values. 110
In summary then, Arnold’s theory of symbolism and folklore
provides a fairly compelling account of how institutions in
different parts of the legal system come to terms with the
mismatch between their professed ideals and the reality of their
functioning. What distinguishes his account was first, the fact that
he rooted the mismatch in the psychological effects of institutional
practice and the anthropological role that institutional doctrines
and practices played within that institution; and second, that he
saw these doctrines as striving to realize a delicate balance
between continuity and change, a perspective that in turn caused
him to resist the Realist urge to simplistically abandon any role
for abstract doctrinal mythology in the functioning of a legal
institution.
B. The Symbolic Role of Authorship
In his magisterial historical account of authorship in American
copyright law, Oren Bracha argues that authorship represents the
dominant form of “ideology” within the institution.111 He describes it
as a form of ideology that constructs reality, but above all else as a
“motivated mystification” that allows copyright to “maintain deeply
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 375.
Id. at 377.
Id. at 379.
Bracha, supra note 6, at 195.
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conflicting images, commitments, and modes of argument.” 112 What
Bracha appears to allude to is a version of Arnold’s framework when
applied to authorship. However, unlike Arnold, Bracha’s account is
less concerned with explaining the psychological and anthropological
dynamics of how the symbolism of authorship continues to influence
the system, and exerts a latent influence on the direction of future
change.
Extending Arnold’s argument about the symbolism and
folklore of institutions to authorship explains why copyright law
has long embodied the mismatch—between doctrine and
rationalization—identified earlier. It explains why authorship is
neither a contingent or accidental construct within the system, but
instead its very rudimentary basis for internal and external
legitimacy; one that reform efforts would do well to pay close
attention to, before suggesting that it be purged from accounts of
the system, or instead translated into doctrine.
1. Symbolizing Human Agency. For ages now, copyright law
has been understood to embody a plethora of independent
normative ideals. While the utilitarian account is today the
dominant one, copyright law has routinely been associated with
the values of desert, morality, autonomy, and corrective justice, all
ideals that have been shown to play a functional (rather than a
purely theoretical) role in the working of the system. 113 And much
like in other contexts, this pluralism presents the institution with
an obvious and intractable problem: incommensurability. 114
Several of these variables, especially the utilitarian and deontic
ones are incapable of being traded off using a common metric.
Should the efficiency gains from greater protection be traded off
against the distributive gains of wider dissemination from
non-protection? How might a creator’s autonomy interest in
expression be weighed against the welfarist goals of greater
reproduction and use? These are questions that arise rather
routinely in discussions of copyright law, even when
contextualized to the facts of individual cases.
Rationalizing these conflicting ideals is impossible at the level
of theoretical abstraction (i.e., owing to their intrinsic
incommensurability). All the same, admitting their functional
inconsistency in the working of the institution runs the risk of

112. Id. at 266–67.
113. See generally Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Normativity of Copying in Copyright
Law, 62 DUKE L.J. 204, 242 (2012).
114. Id. at 233.
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undermining its very legitimacy. 115 Authorship emerges as a
powerful symbol within the copyright discourse that solves several
of these problems. In an intriguing sense, its working within
copyright law reveals strong parallels to the construct of corporate
personality in the world of business laws.
As Arnold argues, corporate personality emerged as a
powerful symbol that served to legitimate the market ideals of
laissez faire capitalism, against the threats of excessive
government intervention. 116 It performed a two-fold role. On the
one hand, it hid the identities of the actual owners of the
corporation, which immunized the corporation from bearing
responsibility for the actions of its owners; and on the other, it
endowed the corporation itself with “rights” both legal and
notional that protected its underlying ideology. 117 As this
progressed, “the symbolism [of corporate personality] got father
and farther from reality,” which “required more and more
ceremony to keep it up.” 118 This made it seem that “not
organizations but principles” were responsible for individual
outcomes and that the law was dealing with “men, and not
organizations.” 119 The complexity of modern corporate law might
in some ways be fairly said to represent the culmination of this
process over time. 120
Authorship does something nearly identical for copyright law.
As an abstract symbol, it masks the conflicting values that
permeate the logic of copyright doctrine. Indeed, the simplicity of
the symbol allows it to be deployed for just about any of copyright’s
several normative values. Authorship can be seen to be about the
author’s incentives, the author’s returns/rewards for valuable
expression, the author’s expressive autonomy, the author’s
distributive concerns, the ethical injustice to authors from
copying, or the author’s need for corrective justice upon normative
harm from copying.
Perhaps most importantly though, it frames the institution of
copyright in terms of an identifiable person, albeit in the abstract.
In more than just a metaphorical sense, copyright law could have
been legitimately understood as a form of regulatory intervention

115. A point that Arnold emphasized. See ARNOLD, SYMBOLS, supra note 12, at
44–45.
116. ARNOLD, FOLKLORE, supra note 12, at 184–98.
117. Id. at 193–94.
118. Id. at 199.
119. Id. at 206.
120. See generally Kahan & Rock, supra note 85, at 2034–36 (describing how Arnold’s
theory applies to the modern context of corporate governance).
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in the domain of valuable expression, an intervention that is
realized through the grant of exclusive rights once a set of
threshold requirements are satisfied. 121 Spectrum licenses might
thus have been a useful framework to conceptualize the copyright
system. Instead, copyright chooses to frame itself around the logic
of rights. It focuses its analytical attention less on work qua
abstract entity, and more on the work qua the product of
authorship, which explains the phraseology “work of
authorship.” 122 The move is at once subtle and consequential, since
through it, the law is according prime significance to the holder of
the protection, rather than its basis/subject. The focus on
authorship thus humanizes the working of copyright law. It
signals that copyright is about a particular form of human agency,
which is deemed worthy of protection. It is the agent and the
agency, rather than mere consequence/artifact, that form the
target of protection.
It is crucial to emphasize that this symbolization is more than
just of rhetorical significance. It perpetuates a set of real
consequences that attach to the rights of the individual protected
through the institution. The logic of equality in Eldred is a prime
example, where the Court based a large part of its holding on the
idea that prior authors and present authors deserved parity of
treatment under copyright law (as regards the duration of
protection). 123 To the contrary, the Court would have been hard
pressed to generate an argument for equality attached entirely to
the works themselves. The argument that works from the last
century deserve equal treatment with new works, seems both less
persuasive, and potentially implausible. It is indeed, the same
logic at play that raises potential Fifth Amendment concerns
about unlawful “takings” whenever copyright reform that seeks to
roll back protection is raised. 124 The author—as personified
beneficiary of the system—is endowed with the protection of the
institution against harmful governmental intervention, even
though the author’s status is itself the product of such
intervention.
Consequently, the personifying effect of authorship produces an
obvious expansionary impulse for the institution—in terms of
subject-matter, duration, scope, and limitations. The logic of

121. For an effort to characterize modern copyright along these lines, see Joseph Liu,
Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. REV. 87, 102–05 (2004).
122. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
123. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 204 (2003).
124. See Note, Copyright Reform and the Takings Clause, 128 HARV. L. REV. 973,
982–83 (2015).
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protecting a personified rights-holder, i.e., the author, takes obvious
persuasive and psychological precedence over an amorphous
conception of the public interest, or the “public domain.” Once the
basic symbol of the author was in place, the institution complexified
the folklore needed to sustain it, through a series of additional and
interrelated symbols.
It is the culmination of this symbol that is embodied in the
modern story about authorial incentives, which effects a deep and
successful personification of copyright’s utilitarian logic, albeit in
a one-sided form. Clearly not rooted in empirical evidence, 125 the
incentives logic is but an overt confluence of copyright’s basic
personification move with its modern market-oriented framing.
Again, it bears emphasis that this is not a critique of the incentives
logic, or of authorship—it is merely a descriptive account of how
the two merge together to generate a powerful symbol for the
copyright system.
2. Rationalizing the Gap. Regardless of whether copyright’s
benefits—be it incentives, control, or monetary rewards—actually
accrue to authors, or whether copyright doctrine even cares about
authorship, the idea of “authorship” as the framing symbol for the
institution legitimates the institution in the popular mind. It
personifies the raison d’être of the copyright system, taking it
outside the realm of just another regulatory intervention. All the
same, discussion of rationalization requires unpacking the agent,
as well as the target, of such rationalization.
While admitting that symbols served to rationalize conflicting
ideas by gaining public acceptance for an institution, Arnold’s
account of institutional rationalization appears to embody a few
equivocations. On the one hand, his identification of “public”
acceptance suggests that raising the legitimacy of the institution in
the eyes of the broader public was a crucial role for the law’s
symbols. 126 At the same time though, he insisted that the law’s
ceremonies were always “addressed to its own members” and not
outsiders, who would be naturally critical of them.127 Further, on the
one hand, the communication of these symbols is taken to happen
principally through courts, where the government is seen to be
“speaking ex cathedra” about its institutions. 128 And, he also insists
that the legal academy play an important role in the rationalization,

125. Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Copyright as Incentives: Did We Just Imagine
That?, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 29, 45 (2011).
126. ARNOLD, SYMBOLS, supra note 12, at 44–45.
127. ARNOLD, FOLKLORE, supra note 12, at 358.
128. ARNOLD, SYMBOLS, supra note 12, at 129.
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by generating a set of abstract principles—jurisprudence—to
reconcile the first-order rationalization developed by courts and other
government actors.129 How do these ideas carry over to copyright?
What these precepts together imply is that a legal
institution’s symbolism and folklore are at all times speaking to
two audiences simultaneously, especially in the absence of any
workable acoustic separation. 130 On the one hand, they are
without doubt addressed to the public, to create legitimacy and
respect for the institution. The powerful symbol of the author and
his/her activities, i.e., authorship, are addressed to a lay audience
to generate sympathy for copyright’s overall utility and to guide
behavior in particular directions. By conjuring up images of
individual authors struggling to make a living using the market,
the emphasis on authorship reaffirms the legitimacy and utility of
the copyright system.
At the same time, the ceremonies surrounding the
symbolism—such as the work-made-for-hire doctrine 131—that are
themselves built around the symbol of authorship, are meant to
maintain the coherence of the particular symbol to participants
within the system, who accept its functional logic. Once
understood in this manner, Arnold’s equivocation appears to fit
the reality of legal reasoning within copyright, where judicial
opinions (and government reports) appear addressed not just to
specialists in the area (i.e., participants), but also the broader
public that is committed to complying with the rule of law and
ensuring a functioning social order.
Courts remain the primary channel of symbolic
communication for Arnold, given the reality that the “settlement
of disputes . . . furnish[es] the stage for the daily enactment of the
miracle play of government.” 132 This is clearly the case with
copyright law, especially given the prominent role that courts play
in policing and elucidating otherwise vague directives. 133 Public
adjudication plays a crucial palliative role for the system in that it
“symbolizes . . . the heaven of justice which lies behind the
insecurity, cruelty, and irrationality of an everyday world.” 134
129. Id. at 46–59.
130. For a general account of acoustic separation in the law, see Meir Dan-Cohen,
Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L.
REV. 625, 630–31 (1984).
131. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining “work made for hire”); id. §201(b) (treating the
person who commissioned a work made for hire as its author).
132. ARNOLD, SYMBOLS, supra note 12, at 128.
133. See generally Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Debunking Blackstonian Copyright, 118
YALE L.J. 1126, 1162–78 (2009).
134. ARNOLD, SYMBOLS, supra note 12, at 129.
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Courts are therefore seen as the copyright system’s first-order
rationalizers, which explains why their reasoning is especially
powerful within the system.
We see this dynamic at play rather prominently in the modern
copyright system, where the judicial validation of a symbol is
crucial. Consider a prominent example from within the idea of
authorship. Recently, the Copyright Office concluded that a
“photograph taken by a monkey” would not qualify for protection,
since authorship required a clear human component. 135 In this, we
clearly see the denial being rationalized in terms of authorship,
albeit on the naïve belief that this independently means
something. Yet, the issue was not considered final and was taken
to the federal courts, where it continues to be litigated. 136 It is
therefore only when a court finally rationalizes the emphasis on
authorship that the issue is considered settled.
To Arnold, legal academics were not mere bystanders in the
legal system. To be sure, when they demanded a conformity
between an institution’s ideals and its functioning, without
recognizing the ceremonial and symbolic nature of the institution’s
doctrines, they were naïve idealists. 137 All the same, to him they
could nonetheless play a crucial role in developing an abstract
jurisprudence to further rationalize the various judicial decisions
that validated an institution’s symbols. 138 We might call this a
second-order rationalization that emerges, from behind the
symbolic reasoning of courts, which adds a second layer of
legitimacy and acceptance for the symbolism itself.
There is an important sense in which this second-order
rationalization of authorship is commonly seen in the copyright
system today. Consciously or sub-consciously, much of the
academic discourse in copyright law today accepts the idea of
authorial incentives being the principal basis for the system. The
“author’s rights” are considered paramount to the system, 139 in one
way or the other; and even when parts of the system are criticized
or flayed, the core assumption about the centrality of authorship—
in this manifestation—is rarely ever questioned directly. I am far
from suggesting that the academic discourse is consciously towing
the line of the system’s dominant symbol. Instead, it is merely to
135. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES
§ 313.2, at 22 (3d ed. 2014).
136. See Naruto v. Slater, No. 15-cv-04324-WHO, 2016 WL 362231 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28,
2016).
137. ARNOLD, SYMBOLS, supra note 12, at 46–59.
138. See id. at 56–59.
139. Bracha, supra note 6, at 265 (noting how copyright is justified using “author’s
rights”).
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show that Arnold’s account of secondary reinforcement is suitably
validated within the academic discourse of copyright as well. In an
important sense, this is both pragmatic and in keeping with what
Arnold’s framework suggests for the future of copyright reform.
IV. CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS
The Essay has thus far argued that authorship is best
understood as a powerful mediating symbol for the effective
functioning and external legitimacy of the copyright system. The
gap between copyright doctrine’s failure to develop an analytical
framework for the idea, and its rampant use in copyright
rationalization, is but an artifact of this symbolism. All the same,
this symbolism is of significant utility to the sustenance of the
system. Much like Arnold’s theory, my point here is merely to
suggest that to the extent that the copyright system merits
functioning—for whatever set of values one ascribes to it—
authorship plays a critical functional role in that endeavor. At the
same time, the symbolism of authorship within the copyright
system hints at a few important lessons for the future direction of
the institution, especially reform efforts.
A. The Futility of Real Authorship Doctrine
As noted previously, a core tenet of Arnold’s theory was the
realization that the mismatch between the reality of a legal
institution as seen in its doctrinal functioning, and its creeds or
principles was inevitable. 140 He characterized as naïve, the belief
that an institution’s creeds could be converted into a reality
manifested in its functioning. Indeed, he went further and claimed
that if an institution became “too sincere” and sought to converge
its symbolism and reality, it ran the risk of being ineffective and
would “fail in action,” since it would thereby squander public
support. 141
These observations are quite telling for copyright’s reliance on
authorship as a symbol. The ideals (and rhetoric) of authorship
motivate the institution at a symbolic level, and yet find little
instantiation in copyright doctrine and practice. This
well-documented reality has caused many, including some courts, to
search for a reality out of the symbolism of authorship, in the nature
of rules, doctrines, and tests for authorship and for determining who
an author is. 142 In so doing, they attempt to bridge the gap between
140.
141.
142.

See ARNOLD, FOLKLORE, supra note 12, at 376.
ARNOLD, SYMBOLS, supra note 12, at 44.
For some well-known judicial efforts in this direction, see Burrow-Giles
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authorship as symbol and authorship doctrine. While such efforts
may certainly be laudable in the abstract, from a practical
perspective they fail to recognize that the symbolism of authorship
requires a strong discontinuity from the reality of the institutions
minutiae, for it to realize its functioning.
Consider in this vein, debates about whether computer-generated
expression represents an act of authorship and the related issue of
whether computers (or artificial intelligence) can qualify as authors,
under copyright law.143 At least some part of this debate revolves
around the question whether copyright’s commitment to authorship can
be used to give meaning and content to that idea, which can in turn be
used to generate a determinate answer.144 This task is fraught with
difficulty from the outset, in that it seeks to find a convergence of
copyright’s symbolism and its doctrinal precepts which, if Arnold’s
theory is correct, will never occur. In other words, even if an account of
authorship were developed in order to answer the question,145 the
institution’s symbolic ideal of the authorship—connected as it is to
human agency—will deviate from the account in significant form, in
order to maintain its legitimacy and mask its other considerations. This
is hardly to suggest that the question/debate isn’t valuable and
important on its own. To the contrary, it is of extreme significance; yet,
worthy of being answered by direct reference to the myriad normative
goals and analytical ideals at stake within the issue,146 rather than
through a deductive application of any authorship logic.
Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 61 (1884) (affirming the idea of the author as
“effective cause” of the work at issue); Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1232–33 (9th
Cir. 2000) (attempting to determine the boundaries of authorship under the joint works
doctrine). For scholarly efforts in this direction, see Buccafusco, supra note 10, at
1255–77; Russ VerSteeg, Defining “Author” for Purposes of Copyright, 45 AM. U. L. REV.
1323, 1338–65 (1996).
143. For a recent review, see generally James Grimmelmann, Copyright for Literate
Robots, 101 IOWA L. REV. 657, 674–81 (2015) (discussing whether computers qualify as
authors under copyright law).
144. See, e.g., Annemarie Bridy, Coding Creativity: Copyright and the Artificially
Intelligent Author, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 28, https://journals.law.stanford.edu
/sites/default/files/stanford-technology-law-review/online/bridy-coding-creativity.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P4SU-FQWC] (“With respect to works of AI authorship, treating the
programmer like an employer—as the author-in-law of a work made by another—would
avoid the problem of vesting rights in a machine and ascribing to a machine the ability to
respond to copyright’s incentives.”).
145. See Buccafusco, supra note 10, at 1255 (explaining that doctrinal challenges
associated with the human perception of copyright law “are not fundamentally
intractable”).
146. For an approach along these lines, focusing on the policy issues involved in the
question rather than the abstract doctrine, see Pamela Samuelson, Allocating Ownership
Rights in Computer-Generated Works, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 1185 (1986). See also Balganesh,
Causing Copyright, supra note 10 (attempting to understand such questions through the
analytics of causation).
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In short then, copyright thinking would do well to jettison its
search for a determinate doctrinal framing of authorship, or the
development of tests for determining who an author is, since that
task assumes an internal meaning to the idea of authorship, which
is at the end of the day more valuable to the institution as a
symbol.
B. The Limited Effect of Empirical (In)validation
Connected to the futility of deriving determinate meaning for
copyright’s construction of the author/authorship, is the limited
utility of relying on empirical data to validate/invalidate
instantiations of the authorship logic within copyright, especially
the authorial incentives framing of authorship. A good amount of
recent scholarship has questioned the empirical basis for
copyright’s account of authorial incentives, which is used rather
frequently to rationalize the system and individual outcomes
therein. 147 An obvious assumption underlying this work is the
belief that if the account is shown to be untrue (or false), the
authorial incentives rationale can be rightfully questioned and
potentially eliminated as a justification for the institution.
In essence, such approaches look for a truth-value in what is
in large part, qua Arnold, the symbolism of the institution. To
Arnold, “[t]he ‘truth’ or ‘falsity,’ or even the content of the
fundamental principles to which the institution clings for moral
support is completely immaterial.” 148 This is an exceptionally
strong observation; but a more tempered version is worthy of our
attention. Within the copyright world, there are some who argue
that empirical validation/invalidation of the institution’s core
principles is the only way to achieve institutional reform. 149 A
tempered reading of Arnold’s theory however suggests that such
empirical evidence is likely to be—at best—only partially
successful in causing an institution to reassess its creeds. 150 Given
that those creeds and principles are consciously divorced from
reality, their falsification is likely to produce limited results.
147. See WILLIAM PATRY, HOW TO FIX COPYRIGHT 50–51 (2011); Paul J. Heald, How
Copyright Keeps Works Disappeared, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 829, 831–32 (2014);
Zimmerman, supra note 125, at 55–56. For a policy effort in this direction, see COPYRIGHT
IN THE DIGITAL ERA: BUILDING EVIDENCE FOR POLICY (Stephen A. Merrill & William J.
Raduchel eds., 2013).
148. ARNOLD, SYMBOLS, supra note 12, at 9.
149. Mark A. Lemley, Faith-Based Intellectual Property, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1328,
1344–45 (2015) (expressing skepticism towards theories of intellectual property that cannot
be subjected to evidentiary validation).
150. See, e.g., ARNOLD, SYMBOLS, supra note 12, at 9.
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Further, the institution’s commitment to authorship is amorphous
enough to withstand complete falsification, given that authorship
is itself capable of melding multiple normative ideals into one
construct. 151 Efforts to invalidate its theory will produce claims of
incompleteness, or instead begin with efforts to question what
truth/falsity themselves mean, as the institution chooses to retain
its legitimacy through its existing creed. In short, the symbolism
of authorship (and authorial incentives) is largely impervious to
evidence.
This is far from suggesting that empirical testing of the
institution’s authorship-based principles is futile on the whole. To
the contrary, it suggests that we need to be realistic about what
exactly such testing can produce by way of institutional change. If
the idea is to achieve greater nuance within the institution’s
doctrinal functioning—rather than its symbolism as a whole—
such testing is sure to bear fruit. The Arnoldian account thus
points to a degree of pragmatism in thinking about the truth-value
of copyright’s putative relationship to authorship.
C. Incremental and Internal Reform
The two prior observations highlight an important reality
embedded within Arnold’s account of legal institutions. Legal
institutions, including copyright, exhibit a significant degree of
path dependence and status quo-ism that deserves
acknowledgement. All the same, Arnold too did not belief that they
were beyond the pale of evaluation, reform, and recalibration. 152
Yet, any such effort had to pay attention to the symbolism that the
institution would be unwilling to dislodge all at once. In a sense,
Arnold’s philosophy was fairly conservative, in so far as he
believed that existing legal institutions had some value to society,
which needed to be harnessed. 153 He was not, however, opposed to
change. One scholar thus imputes to Arnold the philosophy that
“[c]hange is to be gradual, but it must come.” 154 To Arnold, legal
reform therefore had to take account of the law’s symbols, preserve
those symbols when deeply entrenched within an institution, and
re-direct those symbols towards appropriate social goals. In this
151. See generally Buccafusco, supra note 10 (discussing the association of authorship
to the human mind as well as the flexibility of its definition within the courts).
152. ARNOLD, SYMBOLS, supra note 12, at 18.
153. As some have alluded to, Arnold’s theory in this disregard manifest certain
characteristics of “neo-conservatism,” which in turn “limit[s] the rate and degree of change”
within a legal institution. Warren P. Hill, The Psychological Realism of Thurman Arnold,
22 U. CHI. L. REV. 377 (1955).
154. Samuels, supra note 15, at 1002.
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respect, he was a reform-minded Legal Realist, who was steadfast
in his belief that social values ought to motivate the law; his only
insistence was that the re-direction be pragmatic. 155
The Arnoldian account of authorship therefore suggests
recognizing an important role for incremental reform within the
institution and its commitment to its creeds. 156 Instead of finding
true meaning in the creed, or attempting to purge the institution
of its creeds altogether, a more pragmatic approach would lie in
attempting to affect its doctrines towards the social goals that one
identifies for it, while leaving its creeds in place for them to
perform their symbolic function. A significant part of such an effort
would lie in molding the institution’s existing doctrinal devices in
a particular direction through a gradual case-by-case process,
driven by a focus on a normative social agenda, not just the creed.
Much of this effort will have to come, one suspects, through judicial
efforts, where the spiritual plane of the institution finds its fullest
realization. Through individual decisions that are arrived at on a
factual record, the symbolism can be steered in a particular
direction.
Indeed, one might argue that we have—over the last decade—
seen a version of this incremental movement underneath the
symbolism of authorial incentives, within the “transformative use”
doctrine. 157 Courts appear to now recognize, with some exceptions,
that certain kinds of free speech ideals are legitimately outside the
domain of an author’s incentives to create; thereby rendering the
doctrine compatible with institution’s symbolism of authorship. 158
Projects such as the ALI’s Restatement of Copyright are in keeping
with this commitment to incremental reform. 159

155. ARNOLD, SYMBOLS, supra note 12, at 34–37.
156. For a prior account of incremental rule development in copyright and intellectual
property law more generally, see Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Pragmatic Incrementalism
of Common Law Intellectual Property, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1541 (2010).
157. For an excellent review of the evolution of transformative use, see Rebecca
Tushnet, Content, Purpose, or Both?, 90 WASH. L. REV. 869, 891 (2015) (noting how
transformative use has a response to the incentives- and desert-based claims of “authorial
labor”).
158. The idea of transformative use being outside the scope of copyright’s authorial
incentives can be traced back to its very genesis. See Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use
Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1110 (1990). For some recent cases applying the idea to
find fair use, see Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014); Bouchat v.
Baltimore Ravens Ltd. P’ship, 737 F.3d 932 (4th Cir. 2013); Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694
(2d Cir. 2013); A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009);
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007); Bill Graham Archives
v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006).
159. Pamela Samuelson, Is Copyright Reform Possible?, 126 HARV. L. REV. 740, 764,
769–70 (2013).
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D. Alternate Symbols
There will certainly arise times when the principles employed
by a legal institution become so far removed from reality that no
amount of symbolism and ceremony can salvage its public
acceptance. Even Arnold admitted this possibility, and acknowledged
that when the chasm becomes deep and pervasive, the institution
might well have to jettison its old symbols. 160 When this occurs
though, it is critical that the change in ideals—namely, the new
ideals that seek to supplant the old ones—develop a philosophy and
symbolism of their own.161 In short, it takes a new symbol to
displace/defeat an old symbol.
Symbols therefore are to be judged “as good or bad on the basis
of whether they lead to the type of society you like” and one should
“not cling to them on general principles when they are leading in the
wrong direction.” 162 By the mid-1930’s, Arnold himself acknowledged
that American society was in need of “new symbols,” though he
refused to offer specifics about what these symbols might look like,
other than that the old ones were not fulfilling their purpose. 163
There may well come a time (perhaps, it is here already!), when
we conclude that copyright’s symbol of authorship and its ideal of
author’s incentives and rights are proving to be a distraction, and
directing attention away from the appropriate goals that society
should choose to realize through copyright law. When this occurs—
and we conclude that incremental change is insufficient—we might
well need to eliminate the symbolism of authorship and turn the
institution toward alternate values. Very importantly though, this
will require replacing authorship as a symbol with an alternative
one, that can achieve the same level of public acceptance, and
perform a similar legitimating role.
To be sure, in the last few decades some have tried to develop
such alternate symbols, with varying degrees of success. Free
speech, 164 access to knowledge, 165 the commons, 166 and similar
160. Samuels, supra note 15, at 1005.
161. ARNOLD, FOLKLORE, supra note 12, at 378.
162. Samuels, supra note 15, at 1006 (quoting Arnold’s correspondence to Sam Bass
Warner in VOLTAIRE AND THE COWBOY, supra note 15, at 200).
163. Id. at 1005.
164. See, e.g., NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 204–18 (2008); Neil
Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 303
(1996).
165. See generally Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the
New Politics of Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L.J. 804 (2008) (documenting the rise of the
movement around the “access to knowledge” idea).
166. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A
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symbols have galvanized copyright reform efforts at different points
in time, each of which has met with varying degrees of success. Yet,
none has received the level of acceptance needed to challenge the
dominance of authorship as copyright’s principal symbol. Perhaps
one will indeed emerge in due course, if and when it is needed. The
key is simply that for authorship to recede in importance as
copyright’s dominant symbol, it will need to find a worthy
replacement.
V. CONCLUSION
Thinking about authorship through Thurman Arnold’s
account of symbolism in legal institutions brings a new perspective
to understanding the unique role that the idea plays within
copyright law. While commonly criticized for its doctrinal
vacuousness, authorship is now seen to be a powerful mediating
symbol for copyright, one that masks its conflicting ideals, and
gains it public acceptance by personifying them in its principal
beneficiary. In this understanding, its role is less doctrinal and
principled, but instead overtly rooted in the broader nature of
governance and political economy. Any discussion of reforming
copyright’s commitment to authorship would do well to
countenance its critical symbolic role within the institution.
As a reform-oriented Legal Realist, Arnold brought a
distinctively pragmatic attitude to bear on legal institutions, a
perspective that at once recognized their external socio-political
role in the governance landscape, and at the same time exposed
their internal weaknesses in extremely forthright terms. Modern
copyright thinking would benefit significantly from such an
approach. Transposing Arnold’s theory of “political dynamics” to
copyright enables a better appreciation of the institution as an
integrated system, one involving the interaction between multiple
institutional actors, participants, and audiences, all around a
multiplicity of conflicting substantive values. As debates over the
source, content, and direction of copyright reform begin to gain
momentum, looking back to Arnold’s pragmatic advice—delivered
as an academic, executive branch official, judge, and lawyer—will
almost certainly prove to be of immense practical wisdom.
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